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Abstract: The purpose of the present note is to advertise an interesting conjec-
ture concerning a well-known translation in modal logic, by confirming a (highly
restricted) special case of the conjecture.
1  
We work with the conventional language of (mono)modal logic, taking 2 and
some functionally complete set of boolean connectives as primitive, to gener-
ate the set of formulas from the set of propositional variables, p1, . . . , pn, . . .
For p1 and p2 we generally write p and q. Given a formula A,  A abbreviates
the formula 2A∧A, and a formula in which all occurrences of 2 are in subfor-
mulas of the latter form will be called a  -formula. The boxdot translation, τ ,
from modal formulas to modal formulas replaces all occurrences of 2 with  .
According to a well-known result, this translation embeds KT faithfully in (or
‘into’) K in the sense that for all formulas A:
`KT A if and only if `K τ (A).
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Because of its simplicity, the boxdot translation has been a traditional favourite
in the philosophical literature on the significance of such embeddings, for ex-
ample, [7], [4] (and more briefly, by the same authors, in Example 2.9 of [8]
and §2 of [5]. Recent technical studies in which it figures prominently include
Goris [3] and Litak [6]; see also Zolin [10], Lemma 5.9. ([3] and [10] include
references to the literature on modal provability logic, in which again   and
τ  have enjoyed considerable currency.)
Now, experience with a considerable number of cases prompts the con-
jecture that the range of (normal: see below) modal logics in which τ  faith-
fully embeds KT—in the sense that reference to them can replace that to K
in the biconditional inset above—comprises precisely the logics S for which
K  S  KT.1 While it is not hard to see that τ  embeds KT faithfully into
all the logics between K and KT, and also (since `KT A $ τ (A) for all A) that
no proper extension of KT enjoys this status as a candidate ‘target’ for the em-
bedding (with KT as ‘source’), it is not so easy to see that only logics between
K and KT are suitable candidates. (We have informally circulated this problem
amongst several logicians with a special interest in modal translations, but none
has so far been able to provide a solution.) What, in particular, is there to rule
out the existence of a logic -incomparable with KT, in which KT is nonethe-
less embedded by τ ? According to the conjecture just outlined, no such logic
exists: τ  embeds KT only into sublogics of KT. “Logic”, here, means normal
modal logic;2 for these we use the labels of Chellas [1] where they exist, and in
general for a set of formulas Γ , S Γ is the smallest normal extension of S con-
taining all formulas in Γ . When Γ = {A} for some formula A, we write “S  A”
rather then “S  {A}”. In particular, then, K  A is the smallest normal modal
logic containing the formula A. In view of the facts about τ  cited above, the
conjecture amounts to the conjecture that for any non-theorem A, of KT ( =
K  T, in the notation just introduced), there is a K-unprovable  -formula B
with `KA B. As we may put it, the normal extension of K by any non-theorem
1Considerations from the Kripke semantics point in a similar direction, but since these have
proved suggestive rather than conclusive for us to date, they will not be in play explicitly in
what follows. The idea is that whenever A is not KT-provable, the reflexive closures of frames
on which A is valid will validate some formulas—the A* of the proof of Corollary 4 below—not
valid on every reflexive frame. Note that we do not say that A is valid on a frame if and only if
A* is valid on its reflexive closure—by analogy with the well-known fact that τ (A) is valid on a
frame iff A is valid on its reflexive closure. In fact, there can be no function g() from formulas
to formulas with the property that for all formulas A, A is valid on a frame iff g(A) is valid on
its reflexive closure, since different frames with the same reflexive closure need not validate the
same formulas.
2We are taking a normal modal logic to be a set of formulas in the language described above,
containing all the theorems of K and closed under Necessitation, Modus Ponens, and Uniform
Substitution. For such a logic S we write “`S A” for “A 2 S” and read this as: “A is provable
in (or: is a theorem of ) S”. Because of the Uniform Substitution condition, it doesn’t matter
whether we think of KT as the smallest normal modal logic containing the formula 2p ! p or
as the smallest such logic containing all instances of the schema 2A! A. Whereas Chellas [1]
uses T as the name of the schema, we use it as the name for the formula just mentioned.
Rohan French and Lloyd Humberstone, “Partial Confirmation of the Boxdot Conjecture”, Australasian Journal of Logic (7) 2009, 56–61
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2009 58
of KT is  -nonconservative. (Note that the  -formulas comprise precisely the
image of the translation τ .)
Massaged into the form just given, the conjecture clearly admits of no coun-
terexample in which A is of modal degree 0, since for such an A /2 KT, KA is
the inconsistent logic (as A is then a 2-free formula which is not a two-valued
tautology). In the following section, we shall extend this to cover the case of
formulas of modal degree 1—formulas, that is, in which no occurrence 2 lies
within the scope of another occurrence of 2. (On this convention a formula of
modal degree n is also of modal degree n + 1.) Evidently this is a considerable
limitation. The normal proper extensions of K axiomatizable by one-variable
first degree formulas are precisely KD, KDc, KD!, KT, KTc, KT!, K2? and the in-
consistent logic. Amongst first-degree formulas considered as axioms by which
to extend K without restriction as to the number of variables, the most famous
are perhaps those from the infinite sequence of formulas Altn (n 2 N) from
Segerberg [9], p. 52. This section concludes with some remarks on the general
case, without any restriction as to modal degree.
Sometimes when A /2 KT, we can see that K  A is not  -conservative
because its theorems include τ (A), and 0K τ (A). Examples include the cases
in which A is 4 ( = 2p ! 22p) or B ( = p ! 23p, where 3p is ¬2¬p), or Tc
( = p ! 2p). In other cases, 0KA τ (A), such as when A is 2?, 2? ∨32?,
or Dc ( = 3p! 2p, a minor variant of Segerberg’s Alt1); but here it is not hard
to find  -formulas other than τ (A) which are not K-provable but which are
of the form τ (B) for KT-unprovable B. (In the cases just mentioned, take B as
Tc, 3(2p∨2¬p), and p∨2(p! q)∨2(p! ¬q), respectively.) The function
f described in the following section applies to any first degree A to provide a B
with the desired behaviour.
2     
In any normal modal logic, a formula A is provably equivalent to a conjunc-
tion of disjunctions of formulas of the form ¬B ∨ ¬2C ∨ 2D1 ∨    ∨ 2Dn
in which B is 2-free, and for the case of A of modal degree 1, the formulas
C,D1, . . . , Dn are also 2-free;3 we will write such ‘basic disjunctions’ in the
implicational form:
(B∧2C)! (2D1 ∨   ∨2Dn),
in which the consequent is understood as ? when n = 0 and either or both
of the conjuncts in the antecedent may be absent.4 (If both are, we may think
3Fine [2] is the locus classicus for normal forms in (normal) modal logic. Fine takes 3 as
primitive rather than2, and (essentially) works with disjunctive rather than (as here) conjunctive
normal forms.
4We don’t need to write “2C1 ∧    ∧2Cm” in the antecedent, since by normality this sim-
plifies to 2(C1 ∧    ∧ Cm). In terms of the disjunctive formulation, this is why we have just
¬2C rather than ¬2C1 ∨   ∨ ¬2Cm.
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of the antecedent as > or, equivalently, identify the conditional with its conse-
quent.)
Whether or not a given A is a first degree modal formula, if A is written
as a conjunction A1 ∧    ∧ Ak with each Ai (1 6 i 6 k) a basic formula (as
inset above), we define f(A) to be the conjunction of the formulas f(Ai) where
f maps Ai, to the formula:
(s∧ B∧ C)! ( (D1 ∨ s)∨   ∨ (Dn ∨ s)),
in which s is a propositional variable not occurring in Ai (i.e. not occurring in
the given B,C,D1, . . . , Dn), and the  -notation is as explained in Section 1.
So defined, f(A) is not unique, since various different conjunctive normal
forms Vki=1Ai of A can make a difference, as well as the choice of s from
the countable list of propositional variables (see the opening sentence of Sec-
tion 1), though the first difference is inconsequential and the second could be
ironed out by choosing s for Ai as the first pj in that enumeration which does
not occur in Ai. Rather than making any such moves, however, we can sim-
ply take f(A) to denote an arbitrarily selected formula satisfying the defining
conditions.
 1 For any formulaA: `K A! f(A).
Proof: It suffices to observe that where Vki=1Ai is a normal form for A, we
have `K Ai ! f(Ai), for 1 6 i 6 k.
 2 For any formulaA of modal degree 1, if `K f(A) then `KT A.
Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 1, it suffices to check this for eachAi. TakeAi
as above, i.e., as (B∧2C)! (2D1∨   ∨2Dn), so that f(A) is (s∧B∧ C)!
( (D1 ∨ s)∨   ∨ (Dn ∨ s)). Our hypothesis is that this is provable in K, so
weakening the “ ”s in the consequent to simple “2”s, and unpacking the “ ”
in the antecedent (together with some re-arranging), we have:
`K ((s∧ B∧ C)∧2C)! (2(D1 ∨ s)∨   ∨2(Dn ∨ s)).
Since A, and therefore Ai, is of modal degree (at most) 1, s∧ B∧ C is a 2-free
formula, so, using the fact that K is a (fully) modalized logic in the sense of [10],
we can infer that either (a) `K ((s∧ B∧ C)! ? or (b) `K 2C! (2(D1 ∨ s)∨
  ∨2(Dn ∨ s)). In case (a) we have `K B! ¬C (after substituting B or > for
s), and therefore (since `KT 2C ! C) `KT B ! ¬2C, from which we conclude
that `KT Ai. In case (b) we have, substituting
Vn
i=1Di for s and simplifying:
`K 2C! (2D1 ∨   ∨2Dn), so `K Ai and therefore again `KT Ai.
Putting these ingredients together settles the conjecture of Section 1 inso-
far as it bears on first degree formulas:
 3 SupposeA is a first degree modal formula not provable in KT. Then KA
proves some -formula not provable in K.
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Proof: Let A be as described. We may choose f(A) as the desired  -formula,
since it is provable in KA, by Lemma 1 (and Modus Ponens), but not provable
in K, by Lemma 2 (contraposed).
For the first degree KT-unprovable formulas A listed at the end of Section
1, the formulas B given there as having B provable in K  A without τ (B)
provable in K are minor variations on what the definition of f(A) would deliver.
For example, for the case of A as 2? we gave as a candidate B the formula
p ! 2p. Since this A contains no propositional variables, taking s as the first
variable not occurring in A means that s is p (alias p1), and f(A) is therefore
p !  (? ∨ p), which is provably equivalent in K to p ! 2p. More generally,
since we may have to make substitutions, we can say for the proffered examples
of B that B and f(A) are K-interducible in the sense that KB = Kf(A).5 This
happens in the case of A = p! 2p in which again we gave B as p! 2p, while
f(A) is (p∧q)!  (p∨q) and we need to substitute p for q before proceeding
further.
Returning to the conjecture as first formulated in Section 1, we have the
following:
 4 If S = K  Γ for a set Γ of first degree formulas and S 6 KT, then
τ  does not embed KT faithfully in S.
Proof: Given that S 6 KT, pick A 2 Γ r KT, and the proof of Theorem 3 shows
that f(A) is a  -formula in K  A r K. Thus we have (1) 0K f(A) while (2)
`S f(A). Since f(A) is a  -formula, replacing every   in f(A) with 2 gives a
formula A* for which f(A) = τ (A*), and (1) and (2) can be reformulated as
(1 0): 0K τ (A*), (2 0): `S τ (A*). From the fact (recalled in Section 1) that τ 
embeds KT in K, we infer from (1 0) that 0KT A*. If it were also the case that τ 
faithfully embedded KT in S, (2 0) would imply that `KT A*: a contradiction.
What is wanted, then, is a way of lifting the restriction to first degree for-
mulas from Theorem 3 (and Corollary 4)—or else of showing, with a coun-
terexample, that it cannot be lifted. Should the former turn out to be possible,
perhaps the proof of Theorem 3 can be turned into the inductive step of a
proof of the desired general result (by induction on the modal degree of for-
mulas); however, we do not currently see how the details of such an argument
would go.
5Indeed, since the rule of necessitation is not required here, we could say more informatively
that K+B = K+ f(A), where S+ Γ is the smallest (not necessarily normal) modal logic extending
S and containing all formulas in Γ . In fact, everything said in Lemma 2 about KT applies to the
quasi-normal modal logic K + T ( = K[T]0 from [9], p. 179), suggesting a variant on Corollary 4
below in which the references to K Γ and KT are replaced by references to K+ Γ and K+ T, the
qualification “first degree” is dropped, and reference to τ  is replaced by a one to the transla-
tion τ0, where τ0(A) is the result of replacing only the outermost (i.e., not modally embedded)
occurrences of2 inA by . We do not go into this in any detail because of the marginal interest
of τ0 by comparison with τ .
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